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We show that a simple model reproduces very closely the evolution of the GDP in constant dollars
of many countries during the times of recession and recovery. A theoretical analysis illustrates how
an optimal dynamical policy reduces both recession duration and severity, and increases the value
of GDP at all times. We propose a criterion to distinguish a posteriori a dynamical policy from a
static one.
I. INTRODUCTION
Explaining growth and recessions has been central to economics ever since its begining. The recent collapse of the
former block of European communist countries gave much to analyze and comment (see [1] for a review). However,
since recession and recovery are usually split into distinct periods, the factors of decline and growth have been
investigated separatly (e.g. [1, 2, 3]) and little attention has been devoted to the intrisic universal relationship
between recession and recovery. We take the position that after a dramatic change in the economy, the very same
process responsible for the recovery is already at work in the recession. Instead, rather than being afraid of addressing
head-on the recession conditions one make them part of the process of recovery. Thus the focus of the policy planning
is transfered from the negative aspect related to blocking the economic collapse to the optimization of the recovery
process as a whole.
The capability of the government to steer economic recovery encompasses taxation and redistribution, which is a
small part of the processes and phenomena taking place. We show however that in fact when used optimally, according
to an understanding of the underlying economic processes, even this very limited set of tools can lead to remarkably
better results.
In particular we find that quite universally, significant reforms (even the most ultimately successful ones) are
followed by a period of decay. Thus, as an important lesson for policy makers, we derive that the success of a reform
is to be evaluated by a more sensitive analysis that we describe below. Such an analysis discriminates between the
negative effect that the reforms have on the old “order” and the growth induced by the reforms.
In section 2, to validate our model in well-defined conditions, we consider the evolution of the former communist
block economies following their liberalization. We find that our “universal recession-recovery model” fits all of them,
and also some other countries.
In section 3, we describe in detail our model. The main idea is that following dramatic events, large sectors previously
dominating the economy start fading away while previously undevelopped sectors take over. The recession-recovery
process is then completely determined by the value of the returns for the two aggregate sectors and the transfer rate
of economic activity between them.
In section 4, we exploit the understanding of section 3 in order to find an optimal dynamic schedule for the transfer
rate between the fading and the taking-over sectors. More specifically, we are looking for transfer policy (governed
by the taxation-subsidy balance) that minimizes the depth and duration of the recession, and maximises both the
GDP value and the final growth rate. We finally propose a means to differentiate static from dynamical policies in
historical data.
II. THE DATA
The GDP of many countries shows dramatic and sudden decrease followed by a slow recovery, a pattern commonly
known in other areas of Economics as J-shape. Excluding countries affected by external causes such as wars and
petroleum shocks, one is left with about 28 countries. As it turns out, most of these recessions were caused by
political reforms, taxation or financial crises. Figure 1 reports the evolution of the GDP in constant dollars of several
countries, revealing a common pattern. These recessions can be characterised by their intensity (maximum loss of
GDP), the time of the minimum GDP and the time to recover the previous level of economic production.
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FIG. 1: Time evolution of the GDP in constant dollars of 28 countries, and the fits to Eq. (1)
Remarkably, all previously communist eastern European countries have experienced a lasting recession followed by
a recovery. Some countries such as Romania, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic clearly display a double dip (Fig.
1). As it happens, the onset of the second dip of Romania and Bulgaria is unambiguously related to an alternance
of power, substantiating our claim that wrong taxation policies, or their implentation, are to be blamed for further
degradation of the situation. The severity and duration of the recession varies widely between the countries: Poland
has recovered the quickest, while some countries such a Russia, Latvia had just come back to their previous GDP
in 2006. The Republic of Moldova was still 50% down in 2006. These differences raise two questions: what is their
causes? How efficient was the transition policy?
For reasons explained below, we parametrize the GDP J shapes as displayed in Fig. 1, in terms of the following
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formula
W (t) = W (t0)[fe
λ+(t−t0) + (1− f)eλ
−(t−t0)], (1)
where
• W (t0) is the initial GDP at the time t0 of the reform
• f is the fraction of the economy that grows at rate λ+;
• the rest of the economy (1− f) deflates at rate λ−
A J-shaped W is obtained if W ′(t0) < 0, i.e. if fλ
+ + (1− f)λ− < 0.
The fit of recession and recovery times of 28 countries is remarkable (the details are reported in appendix A), and
may a priori suggest a surprising degree of policy constancy; however, as discussed in section 4, dynamical policies
can also be relatively well fitted with the same model and one needs more data than the GDP time series to detect
them. Such sudden drops are signatures of shocks. Nevertheless, the fits are not perfect, the recovery part often
displaying some irregularities in the recovery phase. most of them negative. We could trace possible causes of some
of them to additional shocks: Albania suffered from a bank crisis in 1996, Poland from an “ambitious tax reform” in
2000, and Mongolia from large livestock loss in the same year. The worst secondary shocks were born by Romania
and Bulgaria (1996 elections), and Czech Republic (2000 bank crisis) which resulted into a second dip. This raises
the question on whether the reforms were successful or on the contrary detrimental: comparing the values of λ+, λ−
and f before and after the second dip, one concludes that, according to our model, the crisis in Czech Republic had
long-term positive effects, both the rates of expansion and decline having much improved, at the cost of the initial
fraction of the expanding sector. The case of Romania is best described as bis repetita (non placuerunt): the second
crisis leading to almost the same fitting parameters as the first one. Finally, Bulgaria has spurious results regarding
the first shock, which is due to the fact that GDP was mostly decreasing. Our fit indicates that the growing part was
very small (from 0.2% to 2%), but doing very well, and an immense part steadily decreasing. This is clearly wrong
and easily reproduceable with other shocks if one restricts the data so as to include a very small part of the recovery.
The figures obtained for the second shock are in line with all the other shocks.
III. THEORETICAL MODEL
The rationale behind the fitting function used in the previous section is the following. The after-shock economy
is supposed to consist in two sectors [7], one with activity w1, growing intrisically at rate α1 > 1, and the other one
with activity w2 but instrisically shrinking (α2 < 1). They interact through economic activity transfer taking place
at rate β, according to the difference of activity. Mathematically,
∂w1(t)
∂t
= α1w1(t) + β[〈w〉(t) − w1(t)] (2)
∂w2(t)
∂t
= α2w2(t) + β[〈w(t)〉 − w2(t)] (3)
The governement takes a fraction β/2 of the difference of activity between the two sectors from the largest sector
and gives it to the smallest one. This means in particular that, when the instrisically expanding sector represents a
small part of the economy, the government subsidises it by transfering resources from the shrinking sector, thereby
accelerating the transition. Note that because of redistribution, both sectors end up growing at the same rate.
Therefore, it is wrong to think of the dynamics of this model as describing a growing sector and a declining sector
since both have a growing and a declining part.
Solving the dynamics of this system is straightforward by computing the eigenvalues and associated eigenvectors.
The two eigenvalues are
λ± =
δ[σ/δ − ζ ±
√
1 + ζ2]
2
(4)
where δ = α1 − α2, σ = α1 + α2 and ζ = β/δ. These eigenvalues correspond to the rates measured in the previous
section. The unnormalized eigenvectors are (ζ,−1 ±
√
1 + ζ2). Let us denote by v± = (v±1 , v
±
2 ) the respective
orthonormal eigenvectors. Following standard procedure, one decomposes w(t = 0) into the basis v±, obtaining
w(t) = ω+v+eλ
+t + ω−v−eλ
−t where ω± = w(0).v± are the projections of the initial conditions onto the sector
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decomposition described above. In other words, both w1 and w2 have an increasing and a decreasing part. The
steady state is reached when the importance of the negative component is vanishingly small compared two the positive
component both for w1 and w2. The typical time for reaching this asymptotical regime is O(λ
+/|λ−|) units of time.
Then the two groups grow at the same rate, λ+ (Fig. 5). In this regime, the growth of the negative component is
entirely due to the transfer of activity from the positive one[8].
We shall be interested in this paper in the total economic activity W = w1 + w2 and shall consider the GDP as
its proxy. Also we are interested in the dynamics of inequality between the sectors, measured by ∆ = w1/w2. Note
that the empirical data determine only partially the parameters of formula (1)of previous section: while the rates λ±
can be measured directly, more detailed information is needed in order to determine all three parameters α1, α2 and
β. This is due to the fact that f does not correspond directly to w1(0) since even at the beginning sector 2 has a
growing part (i.e. v+2 6= 0).
A. Static policy making
Assume that the rate α1 and α2 are constant and fixed by constraints beyond the control of the government.
The government’s only influence is in the transfer rate through the tax rate policy. This in itself is a very powerful
instrument that the government is pressed to use: indeed economic activity is linked to employment, and a fast-
shrinking sector implies growing social inequality and voters dissatisfaction. If the rate of shrinking is much faster
than the rate of labor transfer between the two sectors, inequality at the sector level translates into growing social
inequality. In that sense, the inequality between sectors is an upper bound to social inequality. It should be noted
that β is the effective rate of transfer, not the one hoped for by the government; indeed, if the latter is not able to
collect taxes or if its authority is undermined by inadequate rule of law due to the collapse of institutions, the effective
β may turn out much smaller.
The final growth rate depends much on the policy: increasing β reduces both eigenvalues, hence the total growth
rate in the steady state: maximal asymptotic economic growth is achieved when there are no taxes. This seems to
substiante the claims of the so-called supply-side economics (see e.g. [4]). However, global growth rate is not the only
success measure of a taxation policy: inequality is also to be taken into account.
Indeed, since λ− < 0, group 2 would simply disappear in the absence of redistribution. Decision makers who
only focus on growth will therefore take β as small as socially responsible and electorally possible. Some others
will try to minimize inequality. Since both w1 and w2 end up growing at the same speed, their asymptotic ratio
∆ = limt→∞ w1(t)/w2(t) is a measure of economic inequality. Using basic algebra, one finds that
∆ = v+1 /v
+
2 = 1/(−1/ζ +
√
1 + ζ2) ≃ 2/ζ = 2(α1 − α2)/β (5)
if ζ ≪ 1, in which case reducing the inequality by a half requires to double the transfer rate; in addition, inequality
is proportional to the difference of growth rate.
Since the rates are fixed by assumption, inequality only depends on policy, not on initial conditions. Inequality
ceases to exist only for large β, which is ideal communism, at the cost of growth rate.
Therefore, a head of state of a country about to convert from communism to capitalism can choose between a small
but long recession with anemic final growth, or a large but short-lasting recession with large final growth (Fig. 2).
A cynical politican would ensure that the wealth of the majority of voters has increased by the end of his tenure
or at least that the recovery has begun. In addition, he can claim no personal responsibility in the resulting social
inequality.
IV. GRADUALISM VERSUS SHOCK THERAPY
As shown in section 1, all the Eastern European countries have experienced economic recession when switching
from communism to capitalism. The variety of intrisic growth and decline rates and policies yielded vast differences
between speed of recovery and depth of recession of various countries. Understandably a large corpus of literature
investigates what factors could explain this variety of behaviours (e.g. [1, 3]). In particular, the technique of making
the transition abrupt and short has been labelled as “shock therapy” [2]. The concept of shock therapy has been the
focus on long debates which have not been settled to this very day [4]. The other approach is called gradualism, and
advocates to follow a more gentle rythm [2].
Our model makes it possible to investigate this issue. We shall assume that α1 and α2 are intrisic to the economy
and therefore constant; the government controls the economy with the tranfer rate β(t). The shock therapy consists in
lowering abrubtly β from the high level of communism to the small level of capitalism. Gradualism implies a smoother
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FIG. 2: Total economic output versus time for various values of the transfer rate β (α1 = 0.02, α2 = −0.05, w1(0) = 0.1,
w2(0) = 0.9), and the upper envelope (thick black line).
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FIG. 3: Total economic output W for the optimal policy (black line), the naive envelope-based gradual policy (red lines) and
the shock therapy (dashed black line). Same parameters as in Fig 2.
mathematical function for β(t). Figure 2 plots various scenarios forW (t) and shows the influence of β on the outcome.
The cases with constant small β correspond to shock therapy. They are characterized by a deep recession and both
a faster final growth rate and accordingly a higher GDP. Therefore, after many years, the tenants of this policy are
vindicated since their courageous but harsh recommendations are proved correct as regards the growth rate of GDP
and value compared to other static policies. This view is right, but only in a static context, as it maximises the final
growth rate, not the instantaneous one, therefore not the actual GDP (see below), and deep recession ensues.
A. Naive dynamical policy: envelope
Few experiences are more frustrating for a politician than to have implemented a policy that will lead to the recovery
of one’s country, but too late from him to be re-elected. Instead of heroically jeopardizing one’s political career, one
should ask how to implement a policy that would avoid most troubles.
There is another way of looking at this figure: what if one could stay on the upper envelope of all the scenarios
and thereby also maximising the GDP and the final growth rate? Running a thousand scenarios and selecting at
each time t the value of β that gives the maximum yields Fig. 2: taxes should be kept maximal for a while, then β
decreases exponentially fast in the region encompassing the worst phase of the recession, and then decreases faster
than exponentially. Regretfully for a head of state, the minimum of the upper envelope is delayed compared to the
outcomes of low-tax policies, but at much higher GDP. Even worse, in practice it is impossible to stay on the envelope
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FIG. 4: Optimal value of the transfer rate β versus time for the naive envelope-based policy (red line) and the optimal policy
(black line) (same parameters as in Fig. 2).
(see Fig. 3), because at time t, the actual values of w1 and w2 of W (t) are not under direct control.
Curiously, W (t) actually obtainable by using this method is also relatively well fitted with Eq. 1, i.e. with constant
parameters, and gives for the curve reported in Fig. 2 λ+ ≃ 0.020, λ− ≃ −0.019, and f = 0.068 with uncertainties
smaller than a percent, whereas the initial values were 0.02, -0.05 and 0.1, respectively. In other words, the effective
shrinking rate is reduced, the rate of growth of the expanding sector remains unchanged (which is needed in order to
retain the same final growth rate), while the apparent fraction of the expanding sector decreases much; interestingly,
the difference between the fits of the envelope itself and the attainable W (t) is limited to f : the envelope has the
same apparent f as the individual runs.
B. Optimal policy: maximal W
Maximizing W reduces to the maximization of the growth rate with respect to β: ∂W˙
∂β
= 0. This leads to a
transcendental equation to be solved numerically at each time step. The resulting Wβopt is reported in Fig. (3), which
shows unambiguously the benefits of the proposed optimal dynamical policy, that is, of gradualism with respect to
shock therapy. Indeed, the value of the GDP in the recovery phase is increased several folds with respect to static
policies and naive envelope-based dynamical policies, while sharing the same asymptotic growth rate. We therefore
claim that shock therapies are inadapted to economies in crises as regards GDP. Patience and gradualism are better
solutions in this kind of situations.
Looking at the optimal value of β (Fig. 4) reveals that indeed taxes should decreases rapidly, but not instantaneously.
This means that the intuition behind shock therapies is correct, but only in the later stages of the time evolution. What
matters is the road to minimum taxes, all the more since the economy follows multiplicative processes: optimizing
it may change tremendously the fate of countries and people, as shown by the results of envelope-based and optimal
policies.
Fitting Wβopt with Eq. (1) yields f ≃ 0.80, λ
+ ≃ 0.20 and λ− ≃ −0.027. Therefore, the optimal policy both
increases the apparent fraction of the growing part of the economy and decreases the apparent rate of shrinking of
the decaying sector, while of course keeping constant the final rate of growth.
C. Detecting static, envelope-based, and optimal policies
A somewhat frustrating result of the previous two dynamical policies is the impossibility to distinguish them
from a static one. Indeed, in the absence of additional information about the applied economic policies, one cannot
reconstruct it from the GDP time series. For that purpose, one would need data about at least two sectors. Plotting
∆ = w1/w2 as function of time allows one to distinguish a static, envelope-based and optimal policy, as reported in
Fig. 5: a static policy has a negative curvature, while dynamic ones start with a flat line, followed with a positive
curvature and then an inflexion point. All of them reach the same asymptotic values since one imposed a minimum
β = 0.00001 in order to compare the three policies. It may be difficult in practice to discriminate with naked eyes an
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FIG. 5: Sector inequality as a function of time for the optimal policy (black line), the naive envelope-based gradual policy (red
lines) and the shock therapy (dashed black line). Same parameters as in Fig 2.
envelope-based policy from the optimal one, but easy to detect a static policy[9]. However, in further investigations
one could measure w1 and w2, and thus determine all the parameters of the model, including βopt(t).
V. DISCUSSION
Economic transition from a fully centralized state to market economy is a complex process that left durable negative
feelings to those who experienced it. How to deal with it is expectedly not consensual [2, 4], especially during times
when economic criteria and institutions fail [5]. Our simplified model illustrates how much influence a redistribution
policy has on the absolute value of the GDP.
Although it is common to separate recession and recovery into several phases (see e.g. [1, 2]), our model considers
them as two aspects of the same global dynamical economic process. Our approach constrasts with the traditional
factor-based analysis where one must separate the two phases of the dynamics in order to extract possibly relevant
factors; it suggests rather that this type of regressions should be made on the fitting factors that we used rather
than directly on the GDP. Even if taxation policies are by far not the only parameter at play, our simple model
reproduces the typical patterns of recession and recovery, and strongly suggests that an optimal gradualistic approach
both maximises the final growth rate, the actual GDP and minimizes the duration and severity of recession. Our
model implies that one can predict during the recession the location of the minimum and the growth rate of the
recovery phase provided as function of the tax policy.
Arguably, governments’ ability to facilitate structural changes by economic activity transfer was much weakened
more or less during the fall of the Iron Curtain. Accordingly, even if they had in mind the optimal policy (there
is evidence that most of them did not), the result was beyond their crumbling control. However, one of the most
important results of this paper is the existence of an optimal policy and the considerable speed at which the economic
transfer rate should decrease; in practice however, there is a maximal speed of transition, due for instance to human
workforce transfer between sectors [1, 5], which may prevent from applying the optimal policy. However, as regards
the GDP, only the effective rate of transfer matters: should for instance a governement try to set a constant rate, but
have an economic influence collapsing gracefully following the optimal path, it would have implemented unwillingly
the optimal policy. This is to say that the timing of the policy has an enormous influence on the final GDP values:
should the transition have been slightly less brutal in many if not all the considered countries, it would have been
much closer to optimal. On the other hand, a too “gentle” transition policy might have lead to a worse current state.
In short, the optimal policy is best described as gradual shock therapy.
[1] Vladimir Popov. Shock therapy versus gradualism reconsidered: Lessons from transition economies after 15 years of reforms.
2006. TIGER working paper 82.
[2] G. W. Kolodko. From Shock to Therapy: The Political Economy of Postsocialist Transformation. Oxford University Press,
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APPENDIX A: MODEL FITTING
In the following table, srs stands for square residuals sum, srm for square residuals mean, rsrs for relative square
residuals sum, rsrm for relative square residuals mean; years indicates the number of years along which the fit has
been done. The table contains a wealth of data which can be further exploited and whose potential has been only
scratched by the present publication.
Country f α1 1− f α2 srs srm rsrs rsrm years
Albania 59.5 1.064 40.4 0.367 301.97 17.763 402.92 23.701 17
Armenia 14.9 1.159 85.0 0.722 672.87 39.581 1639.2 96.427 17
Azerbaijan 20.1 1.120 79.8 0.639 37.121 2.6515 121.09 8.6493 14
Bahamas 70.8 1.061 29.1 0.662 4.6524 0.4652 4.4493 0.4449 10
Belarus 38.0 1.089 61.9 0.737 151.97 9.4982 241.12 15.070 16
Bolivia 61.9 1.049 38.0 0.775 16.529 0.9183 18.257 1.0143 18
Chile 51.2 1.079 48.7 0.522 56.499 3.3235 37.112 2.1830 17
Cuba 45.7 1.061 54.2 0.690 197.90 11.641 248.80 14.635 17
Estonia 40.7 1.083 59.2 0.688 148.97 8.7630 211.69 12.452 17
Finland 82.1 1.036 17.8 0.367 79.249 4.6617 65.940 3.8788 17
Georgia 17.0 1.079 82.9 0.573 279.77 16.457 1306.0 76.827 17
Hungary 64.0 1.046 35.9 0.694 38.588 2.1438 45.955 2.5530 18
Kazakhstan 15.6 1.137 84.3 0.837 105.25 6.1914 187.13 11.007 17
Latvia 27.4 1.087 72.5 0.651 245.92 14.466 508.97 29.939 17
Lithuania 31.1 1.082 68.8 0.723 214.11 12.594 411.24 24.191 17
Mongolia 64.5 1.045 35.4 0.615 156.65 9.7910 143.21 8.9512 16
Poland 91.3 1.042 8.7 0.018 216.09 12.711 140.94 8.2906 17
Republic of Moldova 14.6 1.081 85.3 0.734 103.41 6.0831 395.33 23.255 17
Russian Federation 20.4 1.100 79.5 0.825 102.63 6.0373 181.19 10.658 17
Slovakia 72.9 1.042 27.0 0.367 102.28 6.0170 95.323 5.6072 17
Slovenia 79.5 1.040 20.4 0.367 29.452 1.7324 27.235 1.6020 17
Sweden 88.1 1.029 11.8 0.549 28.900 1.7000 23.565 1.3861 17
Turkmenistan 29.9 1.080 70.0 0.809 291.63 17.154 538.89 31.699 17
Ukraine 6.71 1.153 93.2 0.835 241.22 14.189 656.64 38.626 17
Uzbekistan 42.6 1.074 57.3 0.829 77.763 4.5743 87.654 5.1561 17
Romania 1 60.4 1.075 39.5 0.526 6.2065 0.8866 8.4506 1.2072 7
Romania 2 60.3 1.070 39.6 0.656 9.3063 0.8460 9.1387 0.8307 11
Czech Republic 1 75.0 1.047 24.9 0.422 3.3792 0.4827 4.2602 0.6086 7
Czech Republic 2 38.1 1.102 61.8 0.927 5.8393 0.5308 5.3579 0.4870 11
Bulgaria 1 0.2 1.967 99.8 0.929 22.261 2.7827 30.514 3.8143 8
Bulgaria 2 64.5 1.051 35.4 0.463 5.0247 0.4567 6.0662 0.5514 11
